3.24 — Aloha. Malama Pono / Farewell. With Love page 4
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Hey woah. Is Kono leaving Clearly show? Is she heading to be replaced by KATH who does no Naval do the job, in any case?!
Talking of KATH, why never they at any time put any rouge on this lousy woman’s cheeks?
So. Adam’s heading on the lam until his enemies are guiding bars. Kono’s going with, and Daniel delivers the finest line of “Can I go with you…?” and CHIN CHIN CHIN is the slowest speaker on the world when it can take him 12 minutes to whisper “follow your heart” into Kono’s ear.
Kono’s not having any garments? What about a passport? Footwear? She’s leaving guiding her genuinely terrible wardrobe and is super fired up. Desire she’d get Steven’s actually awful hair with her to continue to keep her heat and preserve us a summer season of agony.
Back again at H-50 HQ, CHIN CHIN CHIN is rueful and so calling a lady named Leilani whom I will find out in excess of the program of the summer season.
This is a really prolonged scene and I am bored, Display. Why are you doing this to me?
And in which tf is my closure about Bis/xual Muppet Puppet and what he means to Momma McG?
Again in that darkish tunnel with 20 swat officers who have nothing superior to do than safeguard Bis/xual Muppet Puppet, McG is offended walking to go and have a small chat with Muppet. When inside, Muppet tells him he’ll explain to him what is up with Momma McG but only if McG allows him escape. Commotion outside the house with the sounds of all 20 swat customers dying and then some form of laser beam to slice a hole in the metal doorway in purchase to get at Muppet. Muppet will not convey to us who “they” are who are just after him, and McG appears like he could need a midwife to assistance him go to the bathroom.
What a terrible ending, Demonstrate. Really? I never imagined I would say this and basically imply it, but you have available a bizarre and disappointing tiny bit of telly this night.
ZOMBIES!! That’s better.
And. The Finish of Period 3. I guess…
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- Physical Bitcoins: Our Hands-On, End-to-End Review of Opendime Opendime is a tiny USB flash drive that can be loaded with bitcoin by the first user and given to another user, who is, in turn, able to pass it along to a third user and so forth. The private key attached to each Opendime is generated by the device at the time of setup by the user: It is not known by anyone, not even by the first owner or by the Opendime company itself. Opendimes can be passed along multiple times to other users and verified. An Opendime stick can only be redeemed by the last user, who must break the device to access the private key and import it into a bitcoin wallet. A pack of three Opendimes can be ordered for $37.50. Though perhaps too technically demanding for casual Bitcoin users and arguably too expensive for transferring small values (the device is useless after getting the funds out), Opendimes are certainly usable as physical bitcoins. “Opendime transactions are a little different from blockchain transactions,” notes the Opendime FAQ. “Whenever two people meet and trade goods or services for an Opendime, you could say a transaction has occurred, and yet there is nothing recorded on the blockchain. This is different from a normal bitcoin wallet which makes blockchain records continuously and can create a complex web of connections, which can later be explored by anyone.” In other words, Opendimes can be used as totally anonymous, untraceable bitcoin cash. It is possible to do something similar with a paper wallet by printing a bitcoin address and its private key and then passing the paper wallet to another user, with no trace of the transaction recorded on the blockchain. “It is much more private because there is no subsequent blockchain transactions to track,” confirmed Opendime developer Rodolfo Novak in conversation with Bitcoin Magazine. But the problem with using paper wallets in this way is that, somewhere along the transaction trail, someone could copy the private key and take the funds at any point after passing the paper wallet to the next user. Opendime solves this problem by hiding the private key, only revealing it to the last user who must break the device to take funds out. Users of Opendime sticks can choose to pass their stick along to different owners only a few times before being emptied and destroyed, or they can treat their stick like physical cash, allowing it to change hands many times over years or decades. Novak confirmed that, according to user feedback, both scenarios are well used. With bitcoin exchanges under increasing regulatory pressure, it seems likely that face-to-face exchanges like LocalBitcoins could become more popular, which could boost the adoption of Opendime. Novak confirmed that, indeed, users are pre-loading Opendimes and using them to sell bitcoin via LocalBitcoins. According to Novak, Opendime is not vulnerable to regulatory actions because “the devices are ‘point solutions’ without any central service to be regulatory ‘captured.’” Legally, Opendime is a trademark/product of Coinkite Inc., a company founded by Novak and Peter Gray and based in Toronto, Canada. Novak is skeptical of the possibility that Canadian regulators could order Coinkite to stop producing and selling Opendimes. “We and our lawyers don’t believe that’s a possible scenario,” he said. Opendime documentation claims the sticks will last for decades under normal usage conditions; however, Opendime hasn’t been around for decades, so there’s no way to know for sure. But, as Novak explained, the microchip used in each Opendime is rated for 25-100 years, as per the data sheet (page 816) linked in the FAQ. “A few users have put it through a lot of abuse, washing machines, freezing, water, etc. and it survived,” said Novak Novak also stated that it’s not practically possible to make a counterfeit because the device has a high security chip with a factory key just for that reason. “They would have to break our private key, which is practically impossible,” said Novak. “Not even with a few tens of millions of dollars could they peel the chip and try to use an electron microscope to get our key because our chip choice also protects against peeling. So maybe a hundred million dollars could make that happen. If that happens the next batch would have a new key and they would have to spend the money again.” The possibility remains, however, that malicious parties could make fake Opendimes, with an identical look and user interface, which claim a fake balance confirmed by a fake verification process. Therefore, it’s important to check the provenance of the device. Novak explained that there are a few ways for users to check an Opendime signature to verify it’s not counterfeit, including a Chrome extension, the Samourai Wallet, which supports Opendime natively, Electrum (coming soon) and an open-source script. Gray added that each Opendime ships with Python code for verification. “You can use a known-good Opendime to verify an unknown one,” he said. “No internet is required, and self-contained python code is used — just one command to be typed, which takes just seconds.” How It Works Anytime the stick is plugged into a computer, flickering green and red lights indicate its status. Only green means that the device is active; red indicates either that the device hasn’t been activated or that it has already been unsealed (broken) and can’t be used anymore. The lights work correctly even without a computer, with the stick connected to a USB charger or power pack. A file named index.htm on the stick provides all status information. Bitcoin Magazine tested an Opendime stick end-to-end. When we plugged the Opendime stick into a computer for the first time, the red light flickered. The index file warned, “Your Opendime is new and unused. Follow these steps to pick a private key,” and gave us detailed instructions. Following the instructions, we copied a few small files onto the device to seed a random number generator, which gets random bits from random.org. Once the private key was generated, the index file showed the stick’s Bitcoin address and a corresponding QR code. Besides the index file and two folders with programs and utilities, there are four files on the stick: Address.txt, Private-key.txt, Qrcode.jpg and README.txt. The address and Qrcode files show the stick’s bitcoin address in both formats. The private-key file reads: “SEALED — See README.txt for details.” The README gives detailed instructions on how to use the Opendime stick, including how to verify that the device is authentic and how to get funds out. The index file shows two status check buttons: “Check Balance” and “Verify.” Pressing the Verify button resulted in the status message “VERIFIED: Your Opendime does have control over the secret private key corresponding to Bitcoin payment address.” The balance was zero, of course, because we hadn’t yet sent funds to the stick. We sent funds to the stick in multiple transactions from different users, physical locations and bitcoin wallets. After all the transactions were confirmed, the correct balance and previous transactions were displayed in the index file. Now our Opendime stick was active, loaded and ready to be passed along to other owners. If the stick has been loaded with, say, 10,000 bits (0.01 BTC, about $120 at the current exchange rate), the stick could be used as a physical coin carrying that value. At this point in the process, anyone in the ownership chain could decide to empty the stick and transfer the funds to their bitcoin wallet. To do that, the user must unseal the device by pushing a pin through a little circle marked on the back of the device. When this is done, the red light flickers and the index file displays a warning: “UNSEALED DO NOT send more funds to this address or accept this hardware as payment.” Clicking both status check buttons results in a further warning: “Bitcoin was spent from this address. If this is an Opendime address, this means it has been UNSEALED.” The private key is now shown in the index file. The Opendime team recommends using the Samourai wallet. However, we decided to experiment and create a new wallet on blockchain.info. We imported our Opendime private key (Settings – Addresses) and transfered the funds to the blockchain.info wallet, and then to an exchange. In summary, the Opendime stick passed our end-to-end test with flying colors. One caveat: At $13 a piece, Opendime sticks struck us as rather expensive for storing/transferring small amounts and may be better suited to large amounts of over $1,000 or so. “But $13 is actually very cheap as it’s amortized by multiple exchanges of the same unit,” Novak suggested. “Also, Bitcoin transactions are very often more than that.” This is a fair point, since the chain ownership transfer could go on for a very long time, with the stick potentially changing hands many times, just like physical cash. Novak also added that improvements and new features are in the works. Disclaimer: Opendime provided Bitcoin Magazine with free samples to use for the purposes of testing their product for review. This article originally appeared on Bitcoin Magazine. from My Bitconnect Journey https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/physical-bitcoins-our-hands-end-end-review-opendime/ via Bitcoin News https://s3.amazonaws.com/fs.bitcoinmagazine.com/img/images/opendreview.width-800.jpg REGISTER HERE: http://bit.ly/goN4bcc
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- EdgeSecure’s Paul Puey: “Digital Security Will Take Place on the Edges” Security is one of the hottest topics in today’s ever-evolving digital world. A steady flow of debate continues to take place at tech forums worldwide on topics like encryption, passwords, two-factor authentication, hardware wallets and the like. As cryptocurrencies and the tools being used to manage them take shape, questions loom about the most efficacious ways to protect both user assets and privacy. One individual who is at the epicenter of this active space is Paul Puey. He is co-founder and CEO of EdgeSecure, a blockchain-inspired, decentralized, open-source, zero-knowledge, global information security solution platform. Airbitz, his signature enterprise was birthed in 2013 as a bitcoin wallet provider and merchant directory. Today, he’s orchestrating a rebrand of this wallet, now called EdgeSecure. In an interview with Bitcoin Magazine, Puey talks about the tricky balance between new security and privacy measures being introduced and user experience. He also explores an emerging theme called “securing the edges” that forms the basis of his current work BM: What sort of problems are you attempting to solve these days? PP: The aspect of cryptocurrency we initially wanted to address revolved around how to effectively use secure keys. That was the impetus behind our decision to build a feature rich, functionally rich wallet at Airbitz over the years. We feel like this has really differentiated us in the whole area of key management. BM: How does your concept of EdgeSecure fit in here? PP: Our goal has been to broaden Airbitz by turning our key management standard into a platform for other apps. Even before we rebranded, we were already using the term Edge Security to examine how to come up with a solution that’s different from enterprise security. We view our approach as fundamentally different in the sense that we’re not trying to make a router or server more secure. Rather, our aim is to take data and secure it before it ever hits a device. In short, we are able to secure data before it goes out onto a network or server. People and their devices are what we are trying to secure. That’s where the term Edge comes from — before a user’s data ends up on their device, goes out to a network, goes onto a server — the encryption of that data happens first, as we say, “on the edges.” BM: But what about server networks? PP: We still believe that server security is important. But the visibility and encryption of that data all happens first before the data gets saved, broadcast and sent out on the network or gets onto a server. The concept of making data private and secure to the point where only the user can access it “on the edges” has never been an area of focus for cybersecurity companies. BM: So, in a nutshell, how does all of this actually work? PP: It works through a combination of technologies we’ve had for decades but have never been packaged the way we are seeking to. The technology that we’ve developed involves encrypting data on the client side. Most of the software out there doesn’t do this. Rattle off any app that you are running on your computer or your phone, and the data you generate and create is not encrypted, let alone automatically backed up. BM: Are there other security measures you’ll be employing? PP: We’ve also added two-factor authentication, although I fundamentally hate it from a user experience point of view. Two-factor is particularly problematic and a poor approach if the second factor for authorizing access is a phone number or email address. It’s better than nothing, but it’s not what one would consider to be “good two-factor.” BM: Is there a solution to this? PP: Yes, since 2015, we’ve been employing what we call “one touch, two-factor,” where we take two-factor and make it invisible by baking it in our Airbitz app. This eliminates the need for notification by SMS or email, or via an app like Authy or Google Authenticator. BM: Can you talk a bit about password recovery? This can be a big issue with crypto users. PP: It is indeed. Think about this for a moment: If you lose your mobile phone or other type of device, in the Google Authenticator world you have just lost your access completely. So, it’s up to the service you are using to determine a recovery mechanism. What’s interesting is that some services don’t give you one. Others offer recovery via email, SMS, or other similar mechanism which then introduces the same issue. We, therefore, believe in recovery via time lock, where your account is locked for a period of time before you can reset it. BM: In the meantime, are there ways to prevent users from losing their password in the first place? PP: There is some psychology involved here. Part of our philosophy at EdgeSecure is to carefully align technology with humanity. This involves a recognition of the fact that we’re all fallible beings, that we do forget passwords. One step we employ to help people not forget passwords is to ask them to voluntarily enter it from time-to-time when they go to access their app. Our intent is to give them the opportunity to change it if they forget it at that moment. BM: How exactly does this work? PP: We have an algorithm inside of the app that has what we call a reminder “step off,” based on users actually entering it. This “step off” is how frequently we remind you based on how many times you’ve actually entered the password in the past. Obviously, you can get into the app with a pin, thumbprint and now facial ID. But if you lose that device, the password is the only way to get back on. BM: This seems like an idea that other tech solution providers will likely want to pick up on. PP: No doubt. We fashion ourselves as the world’s only password recovery for encrypted data. While that, in and of itself, is a patentable idea, we’ve opted to not patent, in the name of open source, open collaborative effort. BM: What sort of criticism do you hear from the crypto community? PP: One of the main ones we get is that we are not as secure as a hardware wallet. These criticisms come from people that often harbor the biggest fears of something that I have yet to see happen, namely, a person losing crypto from a device attack. Sure, you might hear of publications espousing theoretical exploits. But I haven’t seen evidence of a mass exploit with cryptocurrency taken on a device with encrypted data. Yet there are millions, if not billions, of dollars being poured into solutions for that problem. BM: Aren’t hardware wallets a great resource then for those who have these concerns? PP: They can be. But it’s important to keep in mind that with hardware wallets, the attack vector isn’t someone getting into it digitally over the internet. Rather, the attack vector is the individual user. I can’t count the number of people who say to me after purchasing a hardware wallet, “Now, I’m secure!” I then ask them, what did you do with the backup information? Often they’ll say, “I put it on Google Drive.” My response: “You did what? That’s the worst thing you could possibly do with the private key.” BM: Finally, what are your thoughts regarding security vulnerabilities among centralized exchanges? PP: It’s a big concern, no doubt. Coinbase is obviously the most recognizable example in the crypto world, but I don’t think that their model can survive long term. I’d describe them as a $15 billion piñata for hackers. Yes, they haven’t been hacked and I believe a combination of luck and skill has prevented that from occurring. BM: So do you believe that it’s just a matter of time before a serious hack occurs? PP: Let me say this. One of the hardest aspects of centralized security is that it doesn’t scale. In other words, the bigger you get, the harder it is for you to secure. And as the pot becomes bigger, you have to hire and entrust more and more people inside the company. So it takes just one bad apple with access and there goes a lot of user money. BM: Where do you see this security space headed? PP: In the next 3–5 years, we should actually see a trend where users will seek out what I call Edge-secured apps, where people can control their own data. These encryption and Edge solutions will be invisible to those using the app, which will go a long way toward enhancing user experience along with security and privacy. This article originally appeared on Bitcoin Magazine. from My Bitconnect Journey https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/edgesecures-paul-puey-digital-security-will-take-place-edges/ via Bitcoin News https://s3.amazonaws.com/fs.bitcoinmagazine.com/img/images/Puey_Interview.width-800.jpg REGISTER HERE: http://bit.ly/goN4bcc
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